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Abstract. Smart contracts allow untrusting parties to arrange agreements en-
coded as code deployed on a blockchain platform. To release their potential, it is
necessary to connect the contracts with the outside world, such that they can un-
derstand and use information from other infrastructures. However, there are many
challenges associated with realizing such a system, and despite the existence of
many proposals, no solution is secure, provides easily-parsable data, introduces
small overheads, and is easy to deploy.
In this paper, we propose Practical Data Feed Service (PDFS), a system that
combines the advantages of the previous schemes and introduces new function-
alities. PDFS extends content providers by including new features for data trans-
parency and consistency validations. This combination provides multiple benefits
like content which is easy to parse and efficient authenticity verification without
breaking natural trust chains. PDFS keeps content providers auditable and miti-
gates their malicious activities (like data modification or censorship) and allows
them to create a new business model. We show how PDFS is integrated with
content providers, report on a PDFS implementation and present results from
conducted experimental evaluations.
Keywords: Blockchain · Smart contract · Data feed.
1 Introduction
The concept of smart contracts was introduced by Szabo [26,27,13]. They allow
mutually untrusting parties to arrange and execute agreements without involving any
third trusted party. These agreements are expressed in a programming language, hence
can encode any processing logic possible to express in the used language in a precise
and unambiguous way. The concept has been unexplored for decades; however, with
the rise of Bitcoin [23], distributed consensus, and blockchain platforms in general,
smart contracts can finally be implemented in a practical way. Smart contracts deployed
solely on a blockchain platform have some fundamental limitations. One problem is that
a smart contract can only use resources available on the blockchain. This issue limits
them from using external data provided by other infrastructures, like HTTP(S) data
feeds. Ideally, smart contracts could process data provided by other infrastructures and
use that to encode processing logic. Unfortunately, there are many challenges associated
with that.
One such challenge is the authenticity of data feeds. Data provided to a smart con-
tract should be authentic, so that the smart contract can verify its origin and execute
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accordingly. Unfortunately, the widely deployed Transport Layer Security (TLS) proto-
col [24] is inoperable in such a setting. Secure web servers that deploy it (i.e., running
HTTP over TLS – HTTPS), cannot provide data authenticity to third parties like smart
contracts. First approaches to make this data accessible to smart contracts were central-
ized oracles [31,9,18,6]. This introduced new trusted third parties which fetch HTTPS
websites, parse them, and provide the data to smart contracts (which finally process it).
These solutions present strong trust assumptions (i.e., a new trusted party). To relax it,
a concept of oracles based on trust computing was proposed [31]. These oracles work
similarly, however, the code run by them is executed with the Intel’s Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) [15] framework, which allows proving attestation of the code exe-
cuted by the oracles. A disadvantage of this approach is to position Intel as a centralized
trusted entity, and SGX as a trusted technology. In contrast to these approaches, TLS-
N [25] enhances the TLS protocol by providing non-repudiation. TLS-N authenticates
TLS records sent to clients during client-server TLS sessions. TLS-N requires TLS
stack modifications and provides hard-to-process data feeds, but it does not introduce
any new trusted entities.
In this paper, we propose PDFS, a practical data feed service for smart contracts that
aims to fill the gap between oracle solutions and transport-layer authentication. Our
architecture allows content providers to link their web entities with their blockchain
entities. This design provides many benefits like security, efficiency, and possible new
features. In PDFS, data is authenticated over blockchain but without breaking TLS trust
chains or modifying TLS stacks. Moreover, content providers can specify data formats
they would like to use freely; thus data can be easily-parsable and tailored for smart con-
tracts. Besides that, PDFS provides content providers with a payment framework, but it
does not allow content providers to misbehave by equivocating or censoring queries.
2 Background
2.1 Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Bitcoin [23] introduced the concept of open and decentralized consensus which, in
combination with an append-only data structure, leaded to the existence of cryptocur-
rency without trusted parties. This combination and its variants are usually referred to as
a blockchain. Bitcoin has inspired other systems (e.g., Litecoin [4] and Namecoin [5]).
Interesting and promising platforms leverage blockchain to implement smart contracts.
These systems rely on the append-only property provided by blockchain platforms that
allow realizing smart contracts by a replicated execution (i.e., all participants execute
the same code for the same inputs, thus maintaining the same state). Those platforms
introduce high-level languages that allow to specify agreements by any parties and ex-
ecute these agreements on top of the blockchain.
The most prominent smart contract platform is Ethereum [30]. It follows the repli-
cated execution model, and it provides smart contract oriented high-level languages. In
Ethereum, anyone can specify a smart contract (i.e., an object with a set of methods
and an associated state) and deploy it on the blockchain (each smart contract gets a
unique blockchain address). From this point, anyone can interact with the contract by
sending transactions to its address and calling its method(s). Smart contracts can imple-
ment almost arbitrary logic, including monetary transfers, thus making this technology
appealing to financial related services and other businesses.
2.2 Transport Layer Security
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [24] is one of the most widely de-
ployed security protocols on the Internet. The protocol is designed for the client-server
architecture. TLS aims to provide data confidentiality and integrity and authentication
of protocol participants, but it was not designed to provide non-repudiation. Therefore,
a communicating party (i.e., a client or a server) cannot prove to any third party that a
given content was produced during the TLS connection. The TLS is prominently de-
ployed for securing web traffic (i.e., HTTPS).
Authentication in TLS is based on the X.509 public-key infrastructure (PKI) [14].
Every entity that wishes to get its identity authenticated has to obtain a digital certificate
asserting the identity and its public key. Certificates are issued by trusted entities called
certification authorities, which are obligated to verify the identity of a requester and
issue a certificate correspondingly. During a TLS connection establishment, a server
presents its certificate to the client which verifies the certificate and the server’s identity
and then uses the corresponding public key to continue an agreement of a shared secret
key. This key is used for protecting the subsequent communication.
2.3 Tamper-evident Data Structure
A Tamper-evident Data Structure (henceforth as TDS) is a data structure that allows
building log systems where an untrusted logger records clients’ entries in an append-
only log. The logger must be able to prove to auditors that: a) every logged entry is
still present in the log, and b) one snapshot of the log is consistent with any its previous
version.
Many early proposals aimed to achieve similar properties, mainly in the context
of building a digital notary [20,11,19]. However, the semantics of TDS and multiple
efficient constructions to achieve it were proposed by Crosby and Wallach [16]. In their
system TDS is based on a Merkle tree [22] (also called a hash tree). A Merkle tree is a
binary tree where leaf nodes are labeled with the hash of entries and non-leaf nodes are
labeled with the hash of the concatenated labels of its child nodes. Therefore, the root
of the tree is an aggregated integrity information about all its leaves.
In the Crosby-Wallach construction, the log structure is a Merkle hash tree with
submitted entries as the leaves. The log is append-only, i.e., the entries are sorted in
chronological order of their submission, and no leaf can be retrospectively removed or
modified. The log supports the following history-related operations (we give examples
of these operations in § 4.3):
Addition of an entry. Whenever a new entry is added to a log, a new leaf is added
to the tree, and the tree is re-computed (entries can be added in batches, so that the
tree need not re-compute for every single entry). Adding new data entries requires re-
computing O(log n) nodes, where n is the number of log entries.
Membership Proof Generation for an entry produces a membership proof that
proves that it is part of the log. The membership proof of an entry is the minimal set of
tree nodes (i.e., hashes) required to reconstruct the root. In the described construction,
a membership proof requires O(log n) nodes.
Membership Verification for a given entry verifies whether the entry is part of the
given log snapshot. It takes an entry, a membership proof, and a root value as input and
verifies whether the entry matches the proof and whether the proof terminates at the
given root (i.e., the computed path has the root at the end). The operation returns True
if the verification is successful and False otherwise. It is efficient since it only requires
O(log n) hash operations.
Consistency Proof Generation for two different snapshots of the log, a newer and
an older, provides a short proof (i.e., O(log n) nodes) that the newer snapshot is an
extension of the older one, i.e., the newer snapshot was produced by only appending
entries to the older snapshot.
Consistency Verification takes as an input a consistency proof between two snap-
shots and verifies whether the consistency proof is correct, i.e., whether indeed the new
version of the log was obtained by appending new entries. The verification procedure is
also efficient (i.e., logarithmic in time and space) with respect to the log’s size.
3 Architecture Overview
3.1 System Model
There are the following parties in a PDFS system:
Content Providers are entities that provide content. For a simple and intuitive de-
scription, we assume that the content is provided through the secure web (HTTPS);
however, such a setting is not mandatory, and content providers do not have to run
web services. Domain names identify content providers, and their content is accessed
through URL addresses. Each content provider has a valid TLS certificate. In essence,
content providers are not different from today’s websites.
Contract Parties are mutually untrusting parties that would like to arrange a smart-
contract-based agreement which requires data from a content provider. Contract parties
have to agree on who can act as the content provider for their relying contract. There-
fore, content providers are trusted only locally by parties that want to trust them. We
assume that the protocol parties have access to a blockchain platform with smart con-
tracts enabled (e.g., Ethereum).
We assume an adversary whose goal is to produce fake data on behalf of a content
provider. The adversary can eavesdrop, modify, and inject any protocol messages. She
can also interact freely with protocol parties and the blockchain platform. We assume
that the adversary cannot compromise underlying cryptographic primitives and pro-
tocols (i.e., TLS), and cannot violate properties of the deployed blockchain platform.
Moreover, we assume that the adversary cannot compromise content providers’ secret
keys (i.e., the one used to interact with the blockchain, also known as wallet private key)
and cannot obtain a malicious certificate for a content provider (i.e., cannot compromise
the TLS PKI). However, we discuss such strong adversaries in § 5.
We also assume a content provider trying to misbehave by launching an equivoca-
tion attack [28] or by censoring queries for its content. In the former case, the content
provider should not be able to modify or delete any published content retrospectively.
For the latter case, censorship is especially important in the context of the smart con-
tract, as a content provider could influence a contract execution by censoring some
required content. Thus for this attack, censorship attempts should be at least visible.
3.2 Desired Properties and Design Space
Below we list the desired properties of a data feeds service for smart contracts.
Easily parsable data feeds: data feeds should be easily parsable by smart contracts
which use them. Besides practical implications like a more straightforward code base,
this property improves the cost-effectiveness of smart contracts deployment, as smart
contract platforms usually charge contract executions per number of operations.
Authenticity of data feeds: the high evidence that data feeds are authentic (i.e.,
were produced by a content provider trusted by contract parties) should be provided.
Ideally, authenticity verification should follow a direct and natural trust chain (i.e., con-
tract parties trusting example.com can specify in their contract that the contract can
rely only on data provided by example.com).
Easy to adopt and deploy: all protocol parties (including content providers) should
be able to start using the data feed system without major changes like requiring new
infrastructure or non-backward compatible changes to lower-layer protocols. Ideally,
the system should be implementable and deployable in today’s setting with existing
protocols and infrastructures.
Non-equivocation: Data feeds should be unable to modify or delete content retro-
spectively once data are committed and published. It enforces a content provider to ver-
ify and guarantees the correctness of data before performing publications. Preferably,
providers should implement data structures that are append-only for their publications
database.
3.3 High-level Overview
Design decisions behind PDFS try to achieve all stated properties above. First of
all, in our system non-repudiation is provided directly by content providers. This is
similar to the approaches that modify the TLS protocol; however, the authentication is
not conducted at the TLS layer. Instead, we introduce a layer of indirection that allows
authenticating content on the blockchain.
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Fig. 1: High-level overview of PDFS.
In our design, content providers link their
TLS identities with their blockchain identi-
ties and the locations of special smart con-
tracts used for authenticating and verifying
their content. Such a design provides mul-
tiple benefits. Firstly, it enables verifying
blockchain identities, directly through the ex-
isting TLS PKI. Secondly, it allows relying
contracts to validate the authenticity of data
as simple as calling another smart contract’s
method (without involving any in-contract
expensive public-key operations). Lastly, in-
tegrating content providers with blockchain
enables new features like keeping the providers accountable, proving their unavailabil-
ity or providing a payment framework that can incentivize them to initiate the service.
A high-level overview of our system is shown in Fig. 1, and in this section, we describe
its steps and the main components.
The first step in our protocol is to create a authoritative contract by a content
provider who wishes to participate in PDFS. The main aim of authoritative contracts
is to enable other contracts to verify the authenticity of the content produced by content
providers. Authoritative contracts provide additional functionalities by ensuring that
content providers do not misbehave: a) by retrospectively tampering with their data, or
b) by censoring queries sent to them.
Every authoritative contract provides an API that allows: a) its owner (i.e., the con-
tent provider) to update it, b) other contracts to verify that the content provider indeed
produced given data, c) contract parties to make censorship-evident queries to the con-
tent provider for the specific content (this option is used when the content provider
seems unavailable or is censoring some queries).
In the second step, the content providers create a signed manifest that contains the
following elements: a) a location (i.e., a blockchain address) and interface structure
of its authoritative contract, b) metadata specifying details of provided content. The
manifest is signed, and the manifest’s signature is computed using the private key cor-
responding to the public key from the content provider’s TLS certificate. Such a setting
follows the natural trust chain; therefore, it allows contract parties to verify the au-
thenticity of manifests directly, using the TLS PKI, and without breaking existing trust
chains.
The content provider creates a TDS that will store data entries that the content
provider wants to serve. The first entry of this data structure is the manifest. Although
PDFS data may be published using HTTPS services, those services focus on data pri-
vacy and integrity. We define that the manifest must be signed and added into the TDS
to extend security properties including non-repudiation and non-equivocation to it.
For every update, the content provider adds new data entries to its TDS, re-computes
the data structure, and sends the new root and its corresponding consistency proof to the
authoritative contract (they do not store any actual content, but only TDS roots — the
short authentication information about the content.) The authoritative contract validates
the sent information enforcing the append-only property (i.e., it makes sure that the
content provider is appending data only – not modifying nor removing any entries). The
data entries with their corresponding membership proofs are published at a pre-defined
URL location, so that everyone can locate and access it.
Contract parties that would like to deploy a relying contract (i.e., a smart contract
which depends on a data feed from an external website) have to find and agree on a
content provider (this process is realized out of band). When contract parties find the
content provider they would like to use, they locate and verify its manifest and author-
itative contract, and associate the location of the authoritative contract as an oracle in
their relying contract.
Whenever one contract party would like to call a method that uses content provider’s
data, it accesses the required data entry and its membership proof from the content
provider and then calls this method with this pair (and a fee for content provider) as
the arguments. Now, the method needs to verify whether the content provider indeed
produced the data entry and to do so, the relying contract only requires to call the au-
thoritative contract’s membership verification method. When the data entry is verified,
the relying contract’s method can continue with its processing logic.
4 Details
In this section, we describe components of the PDFS architecture and explain its
different steps from a content provider establishing its PDFS service until contract par-
ties using the provider’s data to make a transaction within their smart contract. We also
discuss how the content provider maintains the service. As shown in Fig. 2, a PDFS ser-
vice consists of an authoritative contract, a web service whose entries are kept within a
TDS, and a manifest. We provide details of these components and their functionality in
this section.
4.1 Service Initialization
In the first step, the content provider initializes a PDFS service by deploying an
authoritative contract in the blockchain. This contract is designed to interact with the
content provider’s back-end service, relying contracts, and contract parties. Initially,
the authoritative contract has empty storage; however, it will store root hashes of the
deployed TDS. These root hashes will enable the contract to check on demand the con-
sistency between two TDS snapshots (i.e., ensuring that the content provider updates
its TDS correctly) and to conduct a membership verification (i.e., verifying for relying
parties that an entry is part of the content provider’s TDS). Further details of authorita-
tive contracts are discussed in § 4.2. Once it is deployed, the content provider gets an
address of the authoritative contract instance.
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Fig. 2: Details of the PDFS architecture and parties inter-
actions.
Then, the content provider
creates a manifest. The manifest
is a file that describes details of
the PDFS service. It is neces-
sary for contract parties, since
based on the manifest, they can
create a workable relying con-
tract. The manifest has to be au-
thentic. Therefore, the content
provider signs it. As TLS certifi-
cates issued by CA are widely
trusted parties on the Internet,
the content provider can sign the manifest using the private key corresponding to its
TLS certificate for supporting HTTPS web traffic. Such a design choice has multiple
benefits. Firstly, it simplifies the signature creation and verification process since con-
tract parties can obtain the required certificate by visiting the content provider’s website.
Secondly, the manifest is authenticated following an already existing trust chain. When
the manifest is signed, it is added as the first element to the content provider’s TDS. We
define and describe the fields that a manifest contains:
URL corresponds to the URL address used by the content provider to publish data,
and it indicates where contract parties can access data entries.
Authoritative Contract Address is the address in the blockchain associated with
the deployed authoritative contract. Contract parties preload their relying contract with
the value of this field (to allow them calling procedures or functions on the authoritative
contract instance).
Authoritative Contract Interface is an abstract structural descriptor of the author-
itative contract. It includes definitions of functions, access method, and parameters.
Likewise the authoritative contract address, data contained in this field has to be em-
bedded in the relying contracts as an object interface. This field is platform dependent
(e.g., the ABI in Ethereum).
Data Structure describes the encoding or structure of data entries that the content
provider stores in its TDS. Typically, content providers use widely adopted data encod-
ings, such as JSON or XML. Thus, the content provider presents here which values and
data types are expected to be found within every data entry. This field is necessary for
contract parties to understand the semantics of data entries and to create their relying
contracts able to parse data entries and implement their processing logic correctly.
Signature is a field that authenticates all values contained in the manifest. As de-
scribed above, the signature is computed using the private key associated with the con-
tent provider’s TLS certificate.
If the TLS certificate expires, the PDFS service is not affected for relying contracts
already deployed. It is because contract parties use the certificate to verify the manifest
signature before they create relying contracts. Furthermore, neither the authoritative
contract nor relying contracts perform any signature verification later. Also, the content
provider does not require to terminate the PDFS service if the TLS certificate is reissued
using the same private-public key pair that was used in the manifest creation.
4.2 Authoritative Contract
The authoritative contract is a central point in the PDFS architecture. It interacts
with the content provider back-end, relying contracts, and contract parties. Its primary
goal is to ensure that the content provider indeed published a specific data entry. A
detailed pseudo-code of the authoritative contract is shown in Alg. 1. An authoritative
contract consists of the functions that allow:
– The content provider to store root hashes once the consistency is verified. This
procedure is executed by calling the UPDATE function (details about the consis-
tency verification in § 4.3). The UPDATE function can be executed only by the con-
tent provider. For efficient storage management and time delays or race conditions
avoidance, the authoritative contract only stores an array of the last K root hash
values committed (K is defined by the content provider).
– Relying contracts to make trustworthy transactions based on data entries whose
origin and integrity are verified by calling the MEMBERSHIP function. This function
checks whether a data entry and its membership proof is valid comparing to stored
roots.
– Contract parties to make censorship-evident queries using the QUERY function and
get responses by calling the GET RESPONSE function. These queries and responses
are sent over the blockchain, therefore they are publicly visible.
Functionalities offered to contract parties are designed to require payments for their
executions. It allows content providers to adopt a new business model receiving pay-
ments for providing data over a PDFS service.1
1 Fees for executing PDFS functions are different from fees for executing transactions on the
blockchain (e.g., Ethereum gas cost).
Algorithm 1 Authoritative Contract Pseudo-Code.
FEEmem: the cost for membership verification,
FEEquery: the cost for making a censorship-evident
query,
locked: boolean value that indicates whether the au-
thoritative contract can be updated,
roots: a map of roots hashes; it uses a timestamp as the
key,
time: a value that indicates the last updating time,
queries: a map of censorship-evidence query made; it
uses a number as the key,
responses: a map of responses for queries made; the
key is associated to existing identifiers in the
queries map,
counter: an incremental number used as the identifier
for the queries made,
NOW(): the current block timestamp,
HASH(): a cryptographic hash function.
1: procedure INIT
2: roots← /0
3: time← 0
4: locked← False
5: end procedure
6: procedure UPDATE(root, proo fcons)
7: assert(sender = owner)
8: assert(locked = False)
9: if CONSISTENCY(root, proo fcons) then
10: time← NOW()
11: roots[time]← root
12: end if
13: end procedure
14: procedure LOCK
15: assert(sender = owner)
16: locked← True
17: end procedure
18: procedure CONSISTENCY(root, proo fcons)
19: if time = 0 then
20: return true
21: end if
22: (rootnew,rootold)←MTH(proo fcons, /0)
23: return (rootnew = root & rootold = roots[time])
24: end procedure
25: procedure MEMBERSHIP(data, proo fmem, f ee)
26: assert( f ee = FEEmem)
27: lea f ← HASH(data)
28: (rootmem, )←MTH(proo fmem, lea f )
29: return rootmem ∈ roots
30: end procedure
31: procedure MTH(proo f , lea f )
32: i← 0
33: hashx ← hashy← lea f
34: if lea f = /0 then
35: i← 1
36: hashx ← hashy← proo f(0).hash
37: end if
38: for i < LEN(proo f ) do
39: if proo f(i).side = RIGHT then
40: hashx ← HASH(hashx||proo f(i).hash)
41: else
42: hashx ← HASH(proo f(i).hash||hashx)
43: hashy← HASH(proo f(i).hash||hashy)
44: end if
45: i← i+1
46: end for
47: return (hashx,hashy)
48: end procedure
49: // Censorship Evidence functions
50: procedure QUERY( f ilter, f ee)
51: assert( f ee = FEEquery)
52: counter← counter+1
53: queries[counter]← f ilter
54: return counter
55: end procedure
56: procedure STORE RESPONSE(id,data)
57: assert(sender = owner)
58: assert(id ≤ counter)
59: responses[id]← data
60: end procedure
61: procedure GET RESPONSE(id)
62: assert(id ≤ counter)
63: return responses[id]
64: end procedure
4.3 Data Update
Adding new data entries to the TDS requires re-computing the root. To run PDFS
service properly, it also requires synchronization of changes between the content provider
back-end (maintaining the TDS) and the authoritative contract which has to be updated
to enable the membership verification of any newly added entry. To synchronize, the
content provider submits the new root hash value along with a corresponding proof for
the consistency verification. This verification uses the provided proof to re-calculate two
hash values. and then, it compares those calculated hashes checking whether they are
equal to the new root value to store and the last one stored in the authoritative contract
accordingly. This guarantees that the new TDS is an extension of the last one committed
confirming that no previous data entry has been altered or removed. If there is an error,
the authoritative contract ignores the submitted data and remains in the current state.
Fig. 3: An example of maintaining a TDS. It is a representation of information provided for the
consistency verification when a new snapshot of the TDS is updated to the authoritative contract.
Each element of the proo fcons indicates the hash value and the corresponding side (hxL refers left
position and hxR refers right position).
Once the new root is accepted by the authoritative contract, the content provider can
make the updated TDS accessible over HTTPS.
In Fig. 3, we show an example of how a TDS evolves when data entries are added,
and what values are sent for submitting roots to the authoritative contract. In case (a),
the new root is directly stored with no previous validation as it is the first one, and
there is no consistency to evaluate. In case (b), the new root is submitted along with the
following consistency proof (proo fcons). The authoritative contract uses the provided
data to evaluate the TDS consistency. In this case, the consistency verification is easy to
deduce since the previous root (h0) is contained in the provided proof. Similarly in the
case (c), the previous root (h123) is contained in the proo fcons array.
However, the case (c) shows a particular situation due to the TDS is unbalanced.
It changes how the consistency verification works for the next root submission, the
case (d). For it, the consistency proof provided is: proo fcons = {h4L ,h5R ,h67R ,h123L}.
Because of the unbalanced TDS, the consistency verification re-calculates both roots,
the previous one (h1234) and the new one (h1234567) by using the same provided proof.
To calculate the previous root, the consistency verification only needs the contained
elements {h4L ,h123L}. Furthermore, the complete array is used to re-calculate the new
root. Therefore, the procedure can confirm the consistency of the new TDS.
4.4 Relying Contracts
A relying contract is a smart contract which is created by contract parties and needs
content providers data to validate conditions and perform transactions. Before it is cre-
ated, contracts parties agree on a content provider they trust which provides a PDFS
service. After validating its manifest signature, contract parties extract the information
contained in the manifest and use it to prepare and deploy a relying contract. In that
way, the relying contract will interact with the correct authoritative contract and be able
to: a) execute the membership verification procedure, b) get the response for a censor-
ship-evident query, and c) parse data entries and execute a processing logic depending
on data entry fields. We provide a pseudo-code example of a relying contract in Alg. 2.
When needed, contract parties request a specific data entry to the content provider,
which responses a data entry along with its respective membership proof. Considering
case (c) in Fig. 3, let us assume the content provider is queried for the data entry d2,
so its response will contain the asked data entry d2 along with a membership proof
proo fmem = {h3R ,h01L ,h4R}. Once that data is submitted to the relying contract, it will
execute the membership verification intreating with the authoritative contract. As we see
in this example, the provided proof and the data entry’s hash value lead to re-calculate
the root h1234 which is stored in the authoritative contract and it confirms data authen-
ticity. If any value is modified, either the data or the proof, the membership verification
re-calculates a different hash value which does not correspond to any stored root, so the
verification fails.
Algorithm 2 Relying Contract Template.
cc: authoritative contract object interface.
1: procedure INIT(addr)
2: cc← AUTHORITATIVE CONTRACT(addr)
3: end procedure
4: procedure SUBMIT DATA(data, proo fmem, f eemem)
5: v← False
6: v← cc.MEMBERSHIP(data, proo fmem, f eemem)
7: if v = True then
8: . . . Decode data input
9: . . . Decide and make transaction
10: end if
11: end procedure
12: procedure IF CENSORSHIP(id)
13: data← cc.GET RESPONSE(id)
14: if data 6= /0 then
15: . . . Decode data input
16: . . . Decide and make transaction
17: end if
18: end procedure
19: interface AUTHORITATIVE CONTRACT:
20: procedure MEMBERSHIP(data, proo f , f ee)
21: procedure GET RESPONSE(id)
22: . . . Any additional procedure defined
4.5 Censorship Evidence
Censorship is an especially challenging threat since a content provider censoring
queries can influence executions of agreements based on smart contracts, and censor-
ship is difficult to prove. However, PDFS extends the authoritative and the relying con-
tract with functions to allow censorship-evident queries. So contract parties can query a
content provider over the blockchain whenever they cannot obtain data directly through
conventional channels (e.g., like HTTPS). All interactions, contract parties’ query and
content provider’s response, are recorded as transactions in the blockchain. Therefore,
they are visible for anyone, and any censorship attempt is publicly observable. We dis-
cuss censorship attacks further in § 5.2.
4.6 PDFS Service Termination
Content providers might need to terminate a PDFS service due to operational man-
agement or security reasons. To do so, they can execute the LOCK function which dis-
allows any future update attempt of the authoritative contract. Locking authoritative
contracts does not introduce collateral damage to already-deployed relying contracts.
A locked authoritative contract can be used for membership verifications as long as the
corresponding root value is stored. In particular, the locking function might be useful
in the case of a security breach (like a stolen blockchain private key), to prevent an
adversary from submitting malicious root values (we discuss details in § 5.1).
5 Security Discussion
In this section, we discuss different attacks and their implications over PDFS. How-
ever, this discussion is extended in § A in the appendix which also addresses issues and
disagreements that one might argue against our proposed solution.
5.1 PKI and Key Compromise
An adversary able to compromise the TLS PKI can create a malicious manifest
and an authoritative contract, and can impersonate the content provider by creating ar-
bitrary content. Interestingly, even if successful, such an adversary cannot undermine
the security of the relying contracts already deployed since these contracts use the cor-
rect authoritative contract instance for data verification. Moreover, by deploying a new
(malicious) authoritative contract, the adversary needs to deploy it over the blockchain,
which makes the attack visible and detectable.
A more severe attack is a compromise of the private key used for the interactions
between the content provider and the blockchain platform. In such a case, the adversary
can add to the existing TDS malicious entries, re-compute the structure, and update the
authoritative contract with a new root. Then, these malicious entries can be used by
relying smart contracts for processing. However, even in that case the attack is visible
since the authoritative contract is updated publicly, on the blockchain. Thus, the content
provider will notice it and terminate its service (see § 4.6).
5.2 Malicious Content Provider
PDFS prevents and mitigates some attacks conducted by a malicious content provider.
The design of authoritative contracts in PDFS does not allow the content provider (or
an adversary with the content provider’s blockchain key) to retrospectively modify or
remove content. The authoritative contract enforces the consistency of the TDS for
every update (see Fig. 3). This property is also crucial for thwarting equivocation at-
tacks [28]. A manifest file identifies the authoritative contract that guarantees that the
content provider cannot equivocate as long as the blockchain platform is secure (see
§ A.2 in the appendix). The content provider can create multiple manifest files and au-
thoritative contract, however, a) it does not influence already deployed contracts, b) is
not necessarily a malicious activity, and c) is visible over the blockchain; thus, it can be
monitored.
PDFS provides non-equivocation by ensuring that content providers’ database is
append-only. However, it does not prevent a content provider from adding two seman-
tically conflicting entries to their databases (e.g., two different results for a same foot-
ball game). Conflicting entries can be harmful to relying contracts as they may lead
to completely different execution paths. Since PDFS does not allow content providers
to “overwrite” their entries, we suggest that such conflicts should be handled by rely-
ing contracts themselves. More precisely, using agreement protocols like implementing
grace periods or submitting data from multiple content providers before making final
decisions, such that any conflicting entry submitted can reverse contracts agreements.
A subtler attack is a content provider censoring queries. That risk is especially im-
portant, when a malicious content provider ignores contract parties’ queries, pretending
unavailability or displaying incorrect data that cannot be successfully verified by rely-
ing contracts. In such a case, PDFS allows contract parties to query the content provider
over the blockchain for a required query (see § 4.5). The content provider is obligated
to response due to the query and content provider’s response are publicly visible.
6 Realization in Practice
In this section, we demonstrate that PDFS fulfills the desired properties explained
in § 3.2. We fully implemented a proof of concept which involved both parties of a
PDFS architecture (the content provider and contract parties). Although we tested PDFS
under a generic scenario (see § B.1 in the appendix), PDFS can be integrated into any
context where smart contracts need to make decisions based on external data. Our so-
lution allows content providers, regardless of the content and data type, to become a
trustworthy data feed for smart contracts.
6.1 Implementation
To approach our implementation of PDFS, we developed a web service for the con-
tent provider using Go v1.10.1 as the programming language. It is a RESTFul API
which offers data entries encoded in JSON format. This application is configured to
support HTTPS, and we deployed a private PKI infrastructure and TLS certificates
using OpenSSL v1.1. For contract parties, we implemented a client in Python v3.6.5
which is able to request data entries to the created web service. Smart contracts, the
authoritative and the relying contract are coded in Solidity v0.4.21 and deployed in an
Ethereum blockchain. To allow reproducibility of our experiments and evaluations, we
publish our implementation at https://gitlab.com/juan794/pdfs.
6.2 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss results obtained from a series of experiments we per-
formed. To evaluate PDFS, we used a computer which has 16GB of RAM and a CPU
Intel Core i7 7700H. We performed measurements regarding the execution cost which
is expressed in Ethereum gas units, and then, converted to US dollars.
We analyzed the cost growth according to the number of data entries in the TDS.
As shown in Fig. 4, we observe that the cost for the consistency and membership verifi-
cation grows on a logarithmic scale as expected since we deployed a TDS using binary
Merkle trees. In the case of the JSON parsing, the cost is constant and does not change
with the TDS size. We also disaggregate total costs to investigate the details for execut-
ing PDFS procedures (see details in Tab. 1). In the case of having a data feed with more
than 1 million (220) data entries, we observe that the consistency verification has a gas
cost of 86,642 on average, where only 4% of this cost is related to the hash calcula-
tions. The remaining percentage corresponds to miscellaneous code, including storage
and control statements, such as asserts. Moreover, we also measured the cost of ex-
ecuting a membership verification, and we observe that it has an average gas cost of
204,242. However, as JSON parsing is not natively supported in Ethereum, 55% of the
total cost is spent on performing this task. On the other hand, the gas consumptions
are 813,111 and 4,355,638 respectively for the authoritative contract and the relying
contract deployment.
Next, we show in Fig. 4 what would be the maximum cost considering the two prices
involved. For our measures, we assumed a price of 5 Gwei per gas unit and a price of
US$105.05 per ether; those are maximum conversion rates presented at the writing time.
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Fig. 4: Ethereum gas consumption and price variation analysis converted to US dollars. (a) Gas
cost of PDFS operations (b) membership verification cost (c) consistency verification cost.
TDS size 21 25 210 215 220
Membership verification cost
JSON Parsing 113,349 (74%) 113,325 (69%) 113,293 (63%) 113,273 (59%) 113,298 (55%)
Hash calculation 447 (1%) 1,107 (1%) 1,933 (2%) 2,757 (2%) 3,583 (3%)
Miscellaneous 39,253 (25%) 49,369 (30%) 61,905 (35%) 74,633 (39%) 87,361 (42%)
Total 153,049 163,801 177,131 190,663 204,242
Consistency verification cost
Hash calculation 149 (1%) 809 (2%) 1,634 (3%) 2,294 (3%) 3,284 (4%)
Miscellaneous 38,419 (99%) 48,551 (98%) 60,961 (97%) 71,158 (97%) 86,358 (96%)
Total 38,568 49,360 62,595 73,452 89,642
Tab. 1: Cost analysis for membership and consistency verification considering multiple sizes of
the TDS.
As a result, the consistency verification costs around US$0.048 in a PDFS service that
contains more than 1 million data entries. This means a cost of US$1.7x10−7 per data
entry. On the other hand, the membership verification of one data entry in a TDS of that
size (220) costs around US$0.11. We recall that it is including the JSON parsing which
is a costly task on smart contracts. Therefore, we show that PDFS is costly viable to
create and deploy a trustworthy data feed for a smart contract. The cost can decrease
if Ethereum starts supporting JSON parsing natively or if content providers use a more
efficient data entry encoding.
PDFS secp256r1 RSA ECRecover
87,361 1,854,634 596,287 38,887
Tab. 2: Ethereum gas consumption of
PDFS compared to signature verifi-
cations.
In Tab. 2, we show the gas consump-
tion comparing PDFS against signature verifi-
cation algorithms, such as ECRecover [2] (na-
tive in Ethereum), TLS-N implementation of
secp256r1 [10] and RSA [7]. We observe that the
Ethereum native function for signature verification is cheaper than PDFS. On the other
hand, PDFS is significantly cheaper that implementations coded on Solidity program-
ming language. Although those alternatives allow contract parties to verify integrity
and provenance, they do not provide accountability or non-equivocation properties from
content providers.
Oper. 50B 150B 500B 1KB 2KB 5KB
Query 25,597 32,399 56,337 90,483 158,644 363,282
Resp. 25,804 32,606 56,544 90,690 158,851 363,489
Tab. 3: The gas cost of the query and response
operations.
Lastly, we investigated the cost of
censorship-evident queries and responses
(see § 4.5). As storing data in Ethereum
smart contracts is expensive [30], we im-
plemented this functionality without in-
volving smart contract storage. Instead, queries and responses are published as
blockchain transactions (as calls to the corresponding functions), but without storing
them in authoritative contracts. That improves the cost efficiency greatly while provid-
ing the same functionality i.e., queries and responses can be read (as they are part of the
blockchain) and responses are authentic (as they are sent within blockchain transactions
signed by content providers). The gas cost of these operations depending on a size of
a query and response are shown in Tab. 3. As presented, the cost grows linearly with
query/response’s size, but queries and responses of the same size have roughly the same
cost.
7 Related Work
TLSNotary [9] is a service that introduces a third-party auditor which attests TLS
session data exchanged between a client and a server. To provide this functionality,
the protocol requires changes to the TLS protocol like an introduction of a dedicated
client-auditor protocol. TLSNotary has many drawbacks. For instance, it is only com-
patible with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, while TLS 1.2 is widely deployed and recommended as
default [8]. TLSNotary is specified with obsolete cryptography algorithms, and it sup-
ports only cipher suites with the RSA algorithm for a secret key establishment. As TLS
records are being authenticated, the output obtained from TLSNotary is hard to parse
and process by smart contracts. Although, the protocol has many disadvantages, it got
adopted by other solutions, like Oraclize [6], which integrates multiple data feed sys-
tems. However, as combined with TLSNotary, it introduced a trusted third-party that
holds secret keys used for auditing TLS sessions.
An alternative approach proposed is to use prediction markets for providing data
feeds, such as [1] and [3]. In such systems, users try to predict real-world events by
betting or voting for them. Usually, these systems are implemented on top of blockchain
platforms, hence they could be easily integrated with smart contracts. Unfortunately,
they have many drawbacks as in the case of disputes there is no responsible party (i.e.,
responsibility is distributed). Moreover, data feeds depend on human inputs which can
be biased, slow, or incomplete.
Town Crier (TC) [31] takes a different approach to instantiate data feeds for smart
contracts. TC deploys trusted computing (i.e., the Intel SGX technology [15]) to allow
special applications to interact with HTTPS-enabled websites. In order to provide au-
thentic data feeds, such an application, is executed within an SGX enclave. Thus, it is
possible to conduct a remote attestation that the correct code was executed. The appli-
cation establishes a secure TLS connection with a website and parses its content, which
then can be used as an input to smart contracts. In contrast to TLSNotary, TC can pro-
vide easy-to-parse data and is flexible since there can be many applications. With the
assumption that the contract parties have verified an attestation of the used enclave,
TC allows relying contracts to avoid expensive public-key verifications by making as-
sertions between enclaves and their blockchain identities (this is a similar concept as
in PDFS). However, TC has some significant limitations. First of all, it positions Intel
as a trusted party required to execute a remote attestation. Secondly, its security relies
on the security of the SGX framework (undermined by recent severe attacks [29]) and
the security of its attestation infrastructure, which is especially undesired as the SGX
attestation infrastructure is a weakest-link-security system (i.e., one leaked attestation
private key allows an adversary to attest any application). TC has inspired other sys-
tems, like ChainLink [18], which aims to decentralize TC applications by forming a
network of them (to detect and deal with possible inconsistencies). Unfortunately, this
design does not solve the main drawbacks of TC.
TLS-N [25] is a more generic approach to provide non-repudiation to the TLS pro-
tocol. In order to realize it, TLS-N modifies the TLS stack such that TLS records sent by
a server are authenticated (in batches). Therefore, TLS-N clients can present received
TLS-N records to third parties which can verify it, just trusting the server (without any
other third trusted parties). The main drawbacks of TLS-N are in its deployability. It
requires significant changes to the TLS protocol and as learnt from the previous de-
ployments the TLS standardization and adoption processes are very slow. Because of
the TLS-N’s layer of authentication, TLS records are being authenticated which is in-
convenient and expensive to process by smart contracts. Furthermore, the TLS layer
is uncontrollable by web developers, and thus, most of their applications would need
to be rewritten for TLS-N. Besides that, TLS-N relying contracts have to conduct an
authentication verification which is a costly operation.
No third
trusted
party
Easy
content
parsing
Required
changes
on
TLSNotary [9] — — TLS Protocol
TLS-N [25] X — TLS Protocol
Town Crier [31] — X —
PDFS X X App
Tab. 4: Comparison to most related
works.
In Tab. 4 we compare PDFS with the com-
peting schemes. As shown, PDFS makes data
feeds authentic and easy to parse without major
changes. It is easy to implement, and it does not
require modifications beyond adding new func-
tionalities in the content provider web service. It
is an advantages compared to the solutions which
require changes on the TLS protocol for operat-
ing. Additionally, PDFS does not require an additional trusted party besides the content
provider itself.
Moreover, we believe that the adoption of PDFS is much more likely than the adop-
tion of competing schemes. In contrast to transport-layer authentication systems, PDFS
requires changes only on the application layer. It also does not require trusted hardware
or relies on ubiquitous TLS certificates following natural for HTTPS trust relationships.
Last but not least, content providers are motivated by economic incentives as PDFS al-
lows them to be paid for authenticating content which usually they publish for free.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed PDFS, a practical system that provides authenticated
data feeds for smart contracts. In contrast to the previous work, PDFS seamlessly inte-
grates content providers with the blockchain platform. This combination provides mul-
tiple benefits like efficient and easy data verification without any new trusted parties,
and new interesting features that the previous platforms do not provide. Thanks to the
deployed tamper-evident data structure (TDS) that is monitored by a smart contract,
content providers cannot equivocate. To mitigate censorship, our scheme provides a
blockchain based API for querying content providers. Besides that, native to blockchain
platforms monetary transfers allow content providers to explore new business models,
where relying contracts would pay a fee for the content verification. Last but not least,
PDFS can be easily deployed today in the application layer without any modifications
to underlying protocols.
We plan to investigate PDFS and its components in other applications. One partic-
ularly interesting example is a non-equivocation scheme for lightweight clients. Due
to placing validation logic in smart contracts, it should be more efficient than, for in-
stance, Catena [28], where clients have to collect and validate all related transactions
by themselves. We believe PDFS could achieve the same property with much shorter
proofs.
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Appendix A Extended Security Discussion
A.1 Data Authentication
Our first claim is that an adversary cannot create a content on behalf of a content
provider. To achieve that, the adversary need to either: a) tamper authenticated proofs
generated by the content providers, or b) update the authoritative contract on behalf
of the content provider, or c) forge the manifest binding the authoritative contract and
identity of the content provider. All these attacks are out of scope our adversary model.
The first attack is infeasible due to the security of the tamper-evident data struc-
tured used [16]. More specifically, generating a membership proof for a non-element
of the data structure is equivalent to breaking a deployed hash function. Therefore, the
adversary to create such a proof for a malicious element has to extend the data structure
by adding the element and updating the authoritative contract by a new root. However,
in this attack, the adversary cannot update the authoritative contract as it enforces the
update procedure (see § 4.3). The update procedure allows only the contract’s owner
to update it. Therefore, without the content provider’s blockchain key, the adversary
cannot update the legitimate authoritative contract and prove on the malicious content.
For the last attack, the manifest’s digital signature is verified using the TLS PKI.
Thus, without the ability to a) use a TLS private key of the content provider, or b) obtain
a digital certificate of the content provider, the adversary cannot create a malicious
manifest on behalf of the content provider. These attacks are out of the scope of our
adversary model, but we discuss them and their implications in the next section.
A.2 51%-Blockchain Attack
In this section we discuss how adversaries able to undermine the blockchain prop-
erties (although they are outside our adversary model) can impact PDFS. In particular,
we focus on the 51%-attack [23] where an adversary possesses more than 50% of the
total mining power of the blockchain network, which would allow her to rewrite the
blockchain history. Such an adversary, could attack availability of PDFS (and any other
blockchain application) by reverting or denying arbitrary transactions (or even authori-
tative contract creations).
An interesting scenario is an adversary colluding with a content provider. Besides
availability attacks, the adversary could allow the content provider to equivocate by
creating two conflicting TDS versions. One version would be maintained on the “main”
blockchain, while the second one would exist only on the “malicious” blockchain mined
by the adversary. Such an attack violates the desired property of keeping content providers
consistent, and enables attacks similar as double-spending attacks [21].
Another interesting scenario is an adversary colluding with one of the contract par-
ties to attack another contract party. Such an adversary cannot forge data entries or an
outcome of the membership verification. However, it is a common practice that smart
contracts define a timeout for inaction, after which deposits of the contract parties are
sent back to them. In that case, the adversary could reverse a genuine transaction of the
victim, causing the timeout from which the colluding party would benefit.
A.3 General Discussion
By analyzing the implications and costs of adopting it, we present PDFS as a viable
alternative for smart contracts to receive authenticated data from content providers. In
this paper, we focus on design a system with desired properties explained in § 3.2.
However, we are aware of issues and disagreements that one might argue against our
proposed solution.
Firstly, one might claim that signature verification solutions would requires less ef-
fort for contract providers, and further, it provides properties of authenticity and prove-
nance of data. Nevetherless, as observed in § 6.2, PDFS is cheaper regarding gas cost
and extends security properties to include accountability and non-equivocation for con-
tent providers. On the other hand, a naive solution would be to publish data hashes
itself in a smart contract, however, that would be prohibitively expensive due to smart
contract storage fees.
Secondly, we aimed a design for smart contracts data feed that avoids the complexity
of alternative solutions and related works. We consider that modifying a protocol exten-
sively used or including special hardware and network specifications makes a solution
highly difficult to deploy; such as modifying the TLS protocol or including oracles us-
ing SGX. By contrast, PDFS offers as a simplier alternative that only requires changes
on the application layer for content providers and contract-to-contract communication
for contract parties. We consider it makes PDFS more practical and easy to adopt, even
without taking the new business model that a content providers might get by providing
data in a PDFS service.
Lastly, our current approach keeps the common trust chain with only includes con-
tract parties who want to stablish an agreements and a content provider who is an au-
toritative entity who defines trustworthy data, also known as the truth. Although the
content provider may be able to misbahave, PDFS is not able to detect such actions due
to data content is not analyzed, but that issue also affects the related works. However,
it can be solved by including agreement protocols. For instance, the relying contract
might revoke any agreement if two conflicting data are submitted within a time gap.
Appendix B Case Study and Implementation Details
B.1 Case Study
In our proof of concept, we considered a scenario where contract parties decide to
settle gambling agreement creating and deploying a smart contract which uses trusted
data from a content provider who adopts PDFS in its service.
Content Provider Following specifications in § 4 and templates provided in § B.2,
our implementation of the content provider is a web service which offers data of football
matches in JSON format. We configured it to support HTTPS, and we obtained a free
dataset from https://www.football-data.org/. We implemented the TDS using
Keccak-256 [12] as a cryptographic hash function. We chose Keccak as it is a state-of-
the-art hash function (the current standard SHA-3 [17] is an instance of Keccak) and
it allows us to reduce the cost of membership and consistency verifications due to its
native support in the Ethereum platform.
Contract parties It is an HTTP client application able to interact with the content
provider and a relying contract. It is capable to get and validate the authenticity of the
manifest, and it is able to submit data obtained from the content provider to the relying
contract which executes the membership verification, interacting with the authoritative
contract, and proceeds to parse the JSON data. In this case, we use a JSON parser coded
in Solidity since it is not supported natively in Ethereum platform.
B.2 Implementations
In this section, we show examples of how JSON data look like in our implemen-
tation and experiments. The JSON examples are related to the case study explained
in § B.1.
{
” s i g n e d ” :{
” u r l ” : ” h t t p s : / / example . com / s o c c e r ” ,
” s c a d d r e s s ” : ” 0 x539c94cb89E127 . . . ” ,
” s c i n t e r f a c e ” :
” [{” c o n s t a n t ” : t r u e ,
” i n p u t s ” : [{ ” name ” : ” j s o n ” ,
” t y p e ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ] ,
”name ” : ” parseJSONdata ” ,
” o u t p u t s ” : [{ ” name ” : ” ” ,
” t y p e ” : ” boo l ”} ] ,
. . . } ] ” ,
” d a t a s t r u c t u r e ” :
”{ i d : s t r i n g , l o c a l : s t r i n g ,
v i s i t o r : s t r i n g , l o c a l G o a l s : i n t ,
v i s i t o r G o a l s : i n t }”
} ,
” s i g n a t u r e ” : ” 6 3 c c 6 a 7 6 f d 0 7 2 5 2 f f 4 a f 4 c
. . . ”
}
Listing 1.1: A manifest example.
{
” c o n t e n t ” :{
” i d ” : ” 3 4 1 5 7 6 ” ,
” d a t e ”:”2018−07−15T18 : 0 0 : 0 0 Z”
” l o c a l ” : ” F r an c e ” ,
” v i s i t o r ” : ” C r o a t i a ” ,
” l o c a l G o a l s ” : 4 ,
” v i s i t o r G o a l s ” : 2
} ,
” p r o o f s ” : [
{” s i d e ” : 0 , ” hash ” : ” 5 e41 f . . . ” } ,
{” s i d e ” : 1 , ” hash ” : ” 0 1 9 5 0 . . . ”} ,
. . . more i t e m s ]
}
Listing 1.2: A PDFS data entry example.
It consist of the data content itself and
its membership proof which is an array of
elements containing a hash value and a side (0
indicates left side and 1 indicates right one).
